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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter is before this court on an appeal from an 
order entered in the district court on July 28, 1998, 
granting the appellees' motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) to dismiss the first amended complaint in this case 
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 
The case arises principally under the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, applicable to the states 
through incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 625, 
629 (1925). In addition, appellants have set forth a 
supplemental state-law claim. We are concerned here with 
the First Amendment's impact on the awarding of a 
governmental contract. In view of the procedural posture of 
this case we accept the appellants' factual allegations as 
true and view them in the light most favorable to 
appellants. See Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 
139 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 
119 S.Ct. 924 (1999). 
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Appellants, Jon McClintock and Cherryhill Associates, 
Inc., brought this action against appellees John 
Eichelberger, Jr., Brad Cober, Alexa Fultz, Robert Will, 
John Ebersole, and Southern Alleghenies Planning and 
Development Commission. Appellants assert that 
McClintock at all times relevant to this action was engaged 
in the business of marketing and advertising through 
Cherryhill, a Pennsylvania corporation, in which he is the 
principal shareholder. The individual appellees are 
commissioners of Blair, Somerset, and Huntington 
Counties, Pennsylvania, and as such are members of the 
Executive Board of the appellee, Southern Alleghenies 
Planning and Development Commission which, according to 
the appellants, "is a corporation or other entity existing 
under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." 
Notwithstanding that imprecise characterization, it is 
undisputed that Southern Alleghenies is a public entity. 
Appellants allege that Southern Alleghenies at all times 
relevant "was engaged in developing the business and 
industries of the Counties of Bedford, Blair, Cambria, 
Somerset, Huntingdon and Fulton." 
 
The complaint alleges that beginning in 1985 appellants 
and Southern Alleghenies "developed an ongoing business 
relationship . . . as independent contractors," meaning that 
appellants have been independent contractors engaged by 
Southern Alleghenies to perform services. In particular, the 
complaint alleges that in 1985 Southern Alleghenies 
retained McClintock to coordinate the promotion of its 
"Seatbelt Safety Demonstration Project" and in 1992 
Southern Alleghenies retained Cherryhill "to coordinate 
providing promotional materials and advertising for the 
1992 United States Olympic Cycle Trials which was 
coordinated by" Southern Alleghenies. Appellants allege 
that they performed their services to the satisfaction of 
Southern Alleghenies. 
 
The final particularized allegation constituting this 
"ongoing business relationship" is that "[i]n the years of 
1995, 1996 and 1997, . . . Southern Alleghenies purchased 
various promotional materials from . . . Cherryhill such as 
magnets, vinyl banner and bags and specially imprinted 
`Slinkies.' " It thus appears that the"ongoing business 
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relationship" between appellants and Southern Alleghenies 
consisted of one contract in 1985 performed by McClintock 
as an independent contractor, one contract in 1992 
performed by Cherryhill as an independent contractor, and 
a vendor-vendee relationship between Cherryhill and 
Southern Alleghenies from 1995 through 1997 involving the 
sale of promotional materials. 
 
The appellants next alleged that because of their "ongoing 
relationship" Southern Alleghenies requested Cherryhill "to 
submit a proposal . . . to perform marketing services in 
connection with [its] TEAM PA Initiative. The marketing 
campaign proposed by . . . Cherryhill was designed to make 
companies in the six county area aware of a survey process 
being conducted prior to interviewers contacting businesses 
to set up interview dates." Of course, appellants allege that 
Cherryhill's proposal provided for Southern Alleghenies to 
pay Cherryhill "for the services to be performed under the 
marketing contract." 
 
Appellants allege that the TEAM PA Initiative was a 
"coordinated effort" between Southern Alleghenies and 
certain otherwise unidentified "Industrial Development 
Corporations." The Industrial Development Corporations 
reviewed Cherryhill's proposal as well as those from other 
firms and "unanimously agreed to award the marketing 
contract to . . . Cherryhill." Appellants allege that on May 
21, 1997, the Finance Committee of Southern Alleghenies 
approved awarding the contract to Cherryhill following 
which the contract was presented to the Southern 
Alleghenies Executive Board for final approval. 
 
Appellants allege that appellee "Eichelberger stated his 
opposition to awarding the contract to . . . Cherryhill 
because [appellants] had supported and performed services 
for public officials and political candidates who 
[Eichelberger] opposed." The other individual appellees 
agreed with Eichelberger. As a result of the vote of the five 
individual appellees "constituting a majority of the 
Executive Board" it defeated a motion to award the contract 
to Cherryhill. The Executive Board by the same vote then 
awarded the contract to another concern. While the 
complaint is unclear on this point, we infer that the 
Executive Board must have more than five members and 
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that some of the members favored awarding the contract to 
Cherryhill. 
 
Appellants alleged that appellees did not award the 
contract to Cherryhill because appellants: 
 
       in the exercise of their rights under the First and 
       Fourteenth Amendments, had supported and 
       performed services for various public officials and 
       political candidates who were opposed by Defendant 
       Eichelberger and some or all of the other individual 
       Defendants, or, in the alternative, Defendant 
       Eichelberger opposed said public officials and political 
       candidates and the other individual Defendants 
       supported Defendant Eichelberger in denying the 
       marketing contract to Plaintiff Cherryhill, with said 
       other individual Defendants knowing that Defendant 
       Eichelberger's oppositions was based upon Plaintiffs' 
       support of said public officials and political candidates. 
 
Appellants alleged that by reason of their "long, ongoing 
and satisfactory business relationship" with Southern 
Alleghenies and the approval of their proposal by the 
Industrial Development Corporations "acting as the TEAM 
PA Advisory Committee" as well as by Southern Alleghenies' 
Finance Committee, they "had the expectation that the 
marketing contract would be awarded to . . . Cherryhill." 
Thus, they alleged that the appellees acting under color of 
state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 penalized them 
from exercising "their rights of free speech and assembly, 
as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
. . . by supporting and working for public officials and 
political candidates of their choice." Appellants also 
asserted that the facts they alleged constituted the state- 
law tort of interference with "the advantageous relationship 
between . . . Cherryhill and . . . Southern Alleghenies." 
Appellants sought compensatory and punitive damages. 
The district court had jurisdiction over appellant's 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. S S 1331, 1343(a), and 1367. 
 
As we have indicated, the appellees moved to dismiss 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court granted the 
motion in its memorandum and order of July 28, 1998. In 
its memorandum the district court set forth the 
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background of the case and then indicated that in Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (1976), "the Supreme 
Court recognized that a public employee who alleges that 
he was discharged or threatened with discharge solely 
because of his partisan political affiliation or nonaffiliation 
states a viable claim under [42 U.S.C.] S 1983 that his First 
Amendment rights have been violated." The district court 
then indicated that in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 
S.Ct. 1287 (1987), the Supreme Court confirmed the Elrod 
holding that patronage dismissals are unconstitutional 
unless political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for 
the effective performance of the public office involved. The 
district court next said that in Rutan v. Republican Party of 
Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729 (1990), the Supreme 
Court extended Elrod and Branti by holding that those 
cases applied "to promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring 
decisions based on party affiliation and support." Id. at 79, 
110 S.Ct. at 2739. 
 
The district court then addressed two Supreme Court 
cases which, like this one, involved not employees, but 
independent contractors, Board of County Comm'rs v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 116 S.Ct. 2342 (1996), and O'Hare 
Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 116 
S.Ct. 2353 (1996). The district court pointed out that in 
Umbehr and O'Hare the Court held that a government may 
not terminate an independent contractor's relationship to 
retaliate against the contractor for the exercise of his rights 
to political allegiance or political association. The district 
court noted, however, that Umbehr and O'Hare involved 
situations in which there had been ongoing commercial 
relationships between the public entity and the 
independent contractor. In fact, Umbehr and O'Hare 
respectively involved trash hauling and motor vehicle 
towing, municipal services of an ongoing character. 
 
The district court indicated that appellants were not in 
the same position as the plaintiffs in Umbehr  and O'Hare as 
Cherryhill "was no more than a bidder or applicant for a 
new government contract." Moreover, the district court, in 
declining to find a sufficient allegation of a First 
Amendment violation in the complaint, made reference to 
the Supreme Court's caveat at the end of Umbehr : 
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       Finally, we emphasize the limited nature of our 
       decision today. Because Umbehr's suit concerns the 
       termination of a pre-existing commercial relationship 
       with the government, we need not address the 
       possibility of suits by bidders or applicants for new 
       government contracts who cannot rely on such a 
       relationship. 
 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 685, 116 S.Ct. at 2352. The district 
court indicated that while the Supreme Court might extend 
the Elrod, Branti, and Rutan "jurisprudence to the claims of 
disappointed bidders and applicants," it would not do so. 
 
The district court ended its opinion by dismissing 
appellants' state law claims. In this regard it pointed out 
that in Pennsylvania there cannot be a tortious interference 
with a contract unless three parties are involved, a 
tortfeaser, a plaintiff and a third party with whom the 
plaintiff is contracting. See Maier v. Maretti, 671 A.2d 701, 
707 (Pa. Super. 1995). Thus, the appellees could not be 
liable as the germane contract was with them. 
Furthermore, the result was not affected by reason of the 
fact that the individual appellees were officers or agents of 
Southern Alleghenies. See Daniel Adams Assocs., Inc. v. 
Rimbach Publ'g Co., 519 A.2d 997, 1000-02 (Pa. Super. 
1987). The district court then entered the order of July 28, 
1998. 
 
Appellants appeal from the order of July 28, 1998. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and exercise 
plenary review on this appeal. Thus, we can affirm only if 
we are certain that the appellants cannot prove any set of 
facts under the first amended complaint which would be 
the basis for relief. See Smith, 139 F.3d at 183. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Initially we identify the precise issue before this court. As 
we have indicated, the Supreme Court in Umbehr  carefully 
limited its opinion to holding that there was a First 
Amendment protection of pre-existing commercial 
relationships while reserving decision on whether there is 
similar protection for bidders or applicants for new 
government contracts who cannot rely on such a 
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relationship. Appellants pleaded their case within the 
Umbehr framework and thus the district court principally 
adjudicated the case on that basis. Accordingly, the 
gravamen of the district court's opinion is that this case is 
distinguishable from Umbehr and O'Hare because 
appellants cannot claim the "status" of being in a "pre- 
existing commercial relationship with Southern 
Alleghenies." 
 
The district court surely was correct in reaching this 
conclusion. In O'Hare the municipality had a list of tow 
truck operators which had included the plaintiff for many 
years. During a political campaign he declined to make a 
contribution to the incumbent mayor following which, 
allegedly in retaliation for that refusal, the municipality 
removed him from the list, thereby terminating a long term 
relationship. In Umbehr the plaintiff was a trash hauler who 
frequently criticized the county government which engaged 
him. Umbehr brought suit charging that the county 
terminated his contract in retaliation for his speech. In 
Umbehr, as in O'Hare, the retaliation terminated an active 
ongoing independent contractor relationship for the 
supplying of governmental services. 
 
This case, however, is very different from Umbehr and 
O'Hare. Notwithstanding the appellants' pleading that they 
have had "an ongoing business relationship" with Southern 
Alleghenies since 1985, the facts which they have pled 
make it clear that the relationship is distinguishable from 
those in Umbehr and O'Hare. Here appellants had two prior 
contracts with Southern Alleghenies for discrete services, 
the 1985 seatbelt project and the 1992 project coordinating 
the provision of promotional materials and advertising for 
the Olympic cycle trials. In addition, Cherryhill as a vendor 
supplied promotional materials to Southern Alleghenies. 
 
Appellants do not allege that the contract for marketing 
services in connection with the TEAM PA Initiative involved 
here is related in any way to their prior contracts with 
Southern Alleghenies. Thus, their status differs from that of 
the plaintiffs in Umbehr and O'Hare who were providing 
ongoing services when the public entities terminated their 
relationship in retaliation for their political activities. We 
therefore conclude that with respect to the TEAM PA 
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Initiative, this action does not "concern[ ] the termination of 
a pre-existing commercial relationship with the 
government." Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 685, 116 S.Ct. at 2352. 
Rather, this case involves a "suit[ ] by[a] bidder[ ] or 
applicant[ ] for [a] new government contract[ ] who cannot 
rely on such a relationship." Id. 
 
Our analysis leads us to affirm the order of the district 
court for each of two independent reasons, one procedural 
and one substantive, either of which alone requires our 
result. The procedural reason is that appellants pled this 
case in the district court relying on their ongoing 
relationship with Southern Alleghenies and thus the 
viability of their claim depends on their ability to 
demonstrate that they had such a relationship. While we 
recognize that the appellants in their district court brief in 
opposition to appellees' motion to dismiss stated that if the 
court found that they did not have the same status as the 
plaintiffs in Umbehr and O'Hare, they nevertheless were 
entitled to First Amendment protection from retaliation, this 
argument went beyond the pleadings. 
 
On this appeal appellants continue to focus on their 
previous relationship with Southern Alleghenies. Thus, they 
summarize their First Amendment argument as follows: 
 
        Cherryhill and McClintock were regular providers of 
       services to Southern Alleghenies and had an existing 
       commercial relationship with Southern Alleghenies. As 
       such Cherryhill and McClintock were entitled to 
       protection from retaliation for exercise of their right to 
       political expression. Thus, Southern Alleghenies' failure 
       to award a contract to Cherryhill solely because 
       Cherryhill and McClintock had worked for supported 
       and worked for political opponents of Eichelberger 
       states a claim for which relief can be granted. 
       Accordingly, the district court erred in granting 
       Southern Alleghenies' Motion to Dismiss the First 
       Count of the First Amended Complaint. 
 
Br. at 9. 
 
In their brief in this court appellants once again contend 
that "[e]ven assuming that this Court finds that [they] do 
not have the same status as the plaintiffs in Umbehr and 
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O'Hare, [they] are nonetheless entitled to protection, from 
government retaliation for exercise of their First 
Amendment rights." Br. at 15. We, however, will not 
entertain this argument as appellants did not plead it as 
the basis for relief in their complaint. See Krouse v. 
American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 499 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1997). Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the district 
court for, as we already have indicated, the appellants do 
not have an ongoing relationship with Southern Alleghenies 
entitled to First Amendment protection under Umbehr and 
O'Hare. 
 
In any event, even if we entertained appellants' argument 
that without regard for their status under Umbehr and 
O'Hare they are entitled to relief, we would affirm. In 
reaching this result we understand that under Rutan 
certain applicants for public employment are entitled to 
First Amendment protection and that Umbehr indicated 
that "[i]ndependent government contractors are similar in 
most relevant respects to government employees." 518 U.S. 
at 684, 116 S.Ct. at 2352. Nevertheless, the Court in 
Umbehr "emphasize[d] the limited nature of [its] decision" 
and thus did "not address the possibility of suits by bidders 
or applicants for new government contracts who cannot rely 
on such a relationship." Id. at 685, 116 S.Ct. at 2352. The 
Court therefore carefully cabined its decision. 
 
In Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 678 (3d Cir. 1986) (in 
banc), we cautioned against extending First Amendment 
holdings if they would cause the judiciary to "intrude itself 
into such traditional practices as contract awards by the 
government's executive, be it on a federal, state or local 
level." Thus, we suggested that if expansion in the area is 
to come the source should be the Supreme Court. Id. While 
the substantive holding in Horn does not survive the later 
Supreme Court cases we have cited, still Horn's admonition 
remains true. Certainly it is difficult for a court to predict 
what the consequences would be on political activity if the 
First Amendment protections are extended beyond the 
Umbehr and O'Hare boundaries. Perhaps the extension 
even would discourage political activity. 
 
On the other hand, retaliation in a situation involving 
ongoing contracts obviously presents a clear set of 
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dynamics. Protection of an independent contractor with a 
pre-existing commercial relationship with the public entity 
from retaliation by reason of his political activity plainly 
protects his First Amendment rights. Accordingly, there is 
a principled reason to limit Umbehr and O'Hare to 
situations in which, unlike the one here, the retaliatory act 
is the termination of an ongoing commercial relationship. 
 
The final issue before us involves appellants' state law 
supplemental claim. We see no reason to discuss this claim 
on the merits as we agree with the district court's dismissal 
of it and have nothing to add to its analysis. We, however, 
point out that the appellants do not contend that the 
district court abused its discretion in exercising jurisdiction 
over this claim. See 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c). 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of July 
28, 1998. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 
The majority's decision to affirm the dismissal of the 
appellants' statutory claim turns on two assumptions, both 
of which relate to McClintock's and Cherryhill's status as 
independent contractors. The first assumption critical to 
the outcome reached by the majority is its factual 
determination that McClintock and Cherryhill did not have 
a "pre-existing commercial relationship" with Southern 
Alleghenies. Majority Op. at 7, [typescript at 9-10] The 
second is the majority's conclusion that, without such a 
pre-existing commercial relationship, the appellants cannot 
assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 based on the 
appellees' failure to grant them a public contract for 
allegedly partisan reasons. Majority Op. at 7-8,[typescript 
at 9]. For the reasons set forth below, I find that the 
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence does not 
support the kind of status-based limitation on individuals' 
rights of political expression and association that the 
majority's decision endorses.1 Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the District 
Court's dismissal of the appellants' S 1983 claim. 
 
The majority's understanding of the constitutional 
significance of the appellants' status as independent 
contractors rests primarily on language from Board of 
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996). This 
understanding arises from two sentences that appear in the 
penultimate paragraph of the opinion. The Supreme Court 
writes: "Finally we emphasize the limited nature of our 
decision today. Because Umbehr's suit concerns the 
termination of a pre-existing commercial relationship with 
the government, we need not address the possibility of suits 
by bidders or applicants for new government contracts who 
cannot rely on such a relationship." Id. at 685. The majority 
reads this language as categorically restricting claims by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The majority also concludes that, before the District Court, appellants 
relied solely on the theory that they had an on-going relationship with 
Southern Alleghenies. Because, however, the District Court found that 
appellants were not regular providers of services and, therefore, not 
entitled to Elrod and Branti protection, I conclude that the issue, as I 
set 
it out above, is fairly before this Court. 
 
                                12 
  
independent contractors, who allege that partisanship 
improperly influenced the awarding of a public contract, to 
those independent contractors who can demonstrate a 
business relationship with the government prior to the 
alleged unconstitutional incident. 
 
The majority's reliance on this language regarding a "pre- 
existing commercial relationship" is misplaced. This 
language is dictum. More importantly, the majority's 
emphasis upon it diminishes the central proposition for 
which Umbehr stands: namely, the Court's "recogni[tion] 
[of ] the right of independent contractors not to be 
terminated for exercising their First Amendment rights." Id. 
at 685; see also O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 
U.S. at 723-26. 
 
Moreover, the majority's emphasis on this language 
obscures the relevance of the many cases in which the 
Court has considered the First Amendment rights of 
government employees. E.g. Rutan v. Republican Party of 
Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 
(1987); Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274 (1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 
385 U.S. 589 (1967). In these cases, the Court made clear 
that the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine extends to 
government employees. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 ("[The 
government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis 
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-- 
especially his ... freedom of speech."); Rutan, 497 U.S. at 
72-75 (holding that hiring, promotions, transfers, and 
recalls of low-level public employees based on partisan 
affiliation or association violate the First Amendment); 
Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (holding that public defender could 
not discharge assistants because of their political affiliation 
without violating the First Amendment); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 
351 (holding that sheriff 's discharge of non-civil service 
office staff because of their political affiliation violated the 
First Amendment). The only exception to this rule is when 
political affiliation is a reasonably appropriate requirement 
for the job in question. See e.g. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568- 
74 (establishing fact-sensitive and deferentially 
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administered balancing test for determining if government's 
interests are sufficiently compelling to overcome public 
employees' First Amendment rights). 
 
None of these cases state, or reasonably should be taken 
to imply, that the ability of independent contractors to 
bring suit against governmental employers for violation of 
their First Amendment rights is categorically distinct from 
that of government employees. Rather, this precedent leads 
logically to the conclusion that independent contractors, 
like government employees, may not be disfavored by state 
actors in the employment process on grounds that offend 
the First Amendment. As best understood under the 
present state of the law, independent contractors enjoy 
essentially the same right to sue as do employees of the 
government who claim to have been denied employment for 
partisan reasons. Established in O'Hare, 518 U.S. at 723- 
26, and Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674-76, the rule that 
independent contractors may not be discharged by 
government employers for exercising their First Amendment 
Rights evolved directly from the line of cases, cited supra, 
in which the Court considered the First Amendment rights 
of government employees. See e.g. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 
674-77 (discussing government employee cases); O'Hare, 
518 U.S. at 718-21 (same). 
 
In O'Hare and Umbehr the Court explained that it was 
extending the rule established in the government employee 
cases to actions involving independent contractors because 
it found no difference of "constitutional magnitude" between 
these two categories of workers. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 
679 (quoting Leftkowitz v. Hurley, 414 U.S. 70, 83 (1973); 
O'Hare, 518 U.S. at 722 (same). For the purpose of 
determining if the First Amendment restricts the freedom of 
governments to terminate their relationships with 
independent contractors, the Court found the similarities 
between government employees and government 
contractors "obvious"; moreover, it found the"threat of 
loss" the same to each in the event of governmental 
retaliation on grounds that violate their right to free 
expression. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674; accord O'Hare, 518 
U.S. at 721-23. "Because of these similarities," the Court 
looked to the government employee precedents "for 
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guidance," Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674, and "appl[ied] ... the 
existing framework for government employees cases to 
independent contractors." Id. at 677. 
 
To the extent that salient differences between these 
classes of workers exist in individual cases, the Umbehr 
Court found "no reason to believe that proper application of 
the Pickering balancing test cannot accommodate" them. Id. 
at 678. As a result, the Court rejected a brightline rule 
distinguishing the rights of independent contractors and 
employees because "whether state law labels a government 
service provider's contract as a contract of employment or 
a contract for services" is "at best a very poor proxy for the 
interests at stake." Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 679; see also 
O'Hare, 518 U.S. at 722 ("We can see no reason ... why the 
constitutional claim here should turn on the distinction 
[between independent contractors and employees], which is, 
in the main, a creature of the common law of agency and 
torts."). Because "such formal distinctions ... can be 
manipulated largely at the will of the government," the 
Court rejected the idea of determining constitutional claims 
on the basis of them. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at at 679 (citing 
Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 532 (1973)). 
"Independent contractors, as well as public employees, are 
entitled to protest wrongful government interference with 
their rights of speech and association," the O'Hare Court 
stated. 518 U.S. at 723. Thus, contrary to the reasoning of 
the majority and the result it reaches in this case, the 
Court expressly has stated the view that independent 
contractors should be treated the same as employees of the 
government for purposes of First Amendment analysis. 
 
Consequently, while it is true that the Court has not 
explicitly addressed the nature of independent contractors' 
right to sue on First Amendment grounds when they are 
considered applicants for new contracts, rather than as 
having pre-existing business relationships with the 
government, the inference to be drawn from Umbehr and 
O'Hare is clear. Given these holdings and the reasoning 
that the Court employed in reaching them, it is logical to 
conclude that all independent contractors fall within the 
standard set forth in Umbehr, in O'Hare, and in the 
government employee cases. The opposite inference, that 
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this precedent should be understood to bar suits by 
contractors who are applicants for new contracts, is not 
logical. 
 
The propriety of the inference that I suggest is 
inescapable in light of Rutan, 497 U.S. at 66-68, the case 
in which the Court considered whether hiring, promotions, 
transfers, and recalls based on government employees' 
political affiliation or support could be considered 
impermissible infringements on their First Amendment 
rights. The Court answered this question in the affirmative, 
id. at 74-77, thereby extending the rule established in 
Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, and Elrod, 427 U.S. at 351, 
relating to politically motivated terminations. In so doing, 
the Court rejected the argument that hiring, promotions, 
transfers, and recalls were "different in kind" from the 
terminations involved in Elrod and Branti because, it 
reiterated, the law is clear that entitlement to employment 
is immaterial to a government employee's First Amendment 
claim. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 71-72 ("For at least a quarter- 
century, this Court has made clear that even though a 
person has no `right' to a valuable governmental benefit and 
even though the government may deny him the benefit for 
any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which 
the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit ... 
on a basis that infringes his ... interest in freedom of 
speech.") (citing Perry, 408 U.S. at 596-98). In this way, the 
Court rejected the argument that an alleged impermissible 
infringement upon an employee's First Amendment right 
must occur in the form of a "substantial equivalent of 
dismissal." Id. at 75. "[T]here are deprivations less harsh 
than dismissal that nevertheless press state employees and 
applicants to conform their beliefs ... to some state-selected 
orthodoxy," the Court found. Id. (emphasis added). In my 
judgment, the fact that the Court expressly held that the 
same concerns that animated the rules in Elrod  and Branti, 
regarding terminations, were present with respect to hiring 
in Rutan undermines the logic embraced by the majority. 
Id. at 78 ("Under our sustained precedent, conditioning 
hiring decisions on political belief and association plainly 
constitutes an unconstitutional condition, unless the 
government has a vital interest in doing so."). 
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Ultimately, it may be difficult for independent contractors 
like McClintock and Cherryhill to prove that the 
government violated their First Amendment rights during 
the employment process. This is so because a public 
employee who makes such a claim bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the alleged violation was a motivating 
factor in his failure to attain a contract. See Mount Healthy, 
429 U.S. at 283-87. This burden would appear more 
difficult to discharge in cases where a contractor has not 
had an on-going relationship with the government, prior to 
applying for a contract. This matter is, however, one to be 
resolved by the trial courts. The point here is that the 
government is not entitled per se to a denial of liability 
simply because an independent contractor, who makes 
such a claim, is bidding on a new contract. See Umbehr, 
518 U.S. at 678. 
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